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Some	champions	of	universalism	cite	Barth	as	a	great	theologian	who	
justifies	or	supports	the	belief	that	all	humans,	created	by	a	loving	God,	
will	in	the	end	be	saved.	While	this	interpretation	of	Barth	has	been	
disputed,	the	controversy	raises	questions	which	must	be	addressed.	
Recently	 Tom	 Greggs	 attempted	 to	 move	 us	 through	 the	 impasse	
of	 contradictory	 claims	 about	 the	 extent	 of	 Barth’s	 universalism.	
Greggs	argued	that	Barth	did	not	reject	universalism	completely	but	
only	problematic	elements	associated	with	it,	chiefly	those	elements	
associated	with	the	theory	of	apokatastasis.1	In	rejecting	universalism	
under	 this	guise,	however,	Barth	 is	not	 rejecting	 the	 friendliness	of	
Jesus	Christ	towards	all	humanity.2	In	response	to	Greggs’	argument,	
this	 paper	 argues	 that	Barth	 stopped	 short	 of	 a	 full	 commitment	 to	
universalism,	 that	 he	 recognized	 and	 honoured	 a	 boundary	 that	
precluded	his	 adoption	of	universalism	 in	 the	 structure	 and	 content	
of	 his	 theology. The	 rejection	 of	 faulty	 ‘elements’	 in	 universalism	
does	not	exhaust	the	proper	caution	Barth	exercised.	In	fact,	Barth’s	
theology	 does	 not	 require	 universalism	 at	 any	 point,	 and	 we	 will	
attempt	to	show,	with	reference	to	T.	F.	Torrance,	why	this	is	so.	
Engaging	in	dialogue	with	Tom	Greggs
Greggs	rightfully	notes	 that	Barth	 took	some	opportunities	 to	reject	
universalism.	 For	 example,	 in	Church Dogmatics	 II.2	 he	 speaks	 of	
God	enlarging	the	circle	of	the	elect	to	include	people	who	have	lived	
outside	God’s	community:	
T
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It	 is	 the	 concern	 of	God	 that	 there	 should	 be	 these	 frontier-
crossings.	[...]	It	is	His	concern	what	is	to	be	the	final	extent	
of	the	circle.	If	we	are	to	respect	the	freedom	of	divine	grace,	
we	cannot	venture	the	statement	that	it	must	and	will	finally	be	
coincident	with	 the	world	of	man	as	such	(as	 in	 the	doctrine	
of	the	so-called	apokatastasis).	No	such	right	or	necessity	can	
legitimately	 be	 deduced.	 Just	 as	 the	 gracious	 God	 does	 not	
need	to	elect	or	call	any	single	man,	so	He	does	not	need	to	
elect	or	call	all	mankind.3
Yet	 Barth	 also	 argues	 the	 opposite,	 that	 we	 cannot	 exclude	 the	
possibility	 that	 all	may	be	 saved	 in	 the	 end,	 because	 of	God’s	 true	
freedom	to	do	it:	
But,	 again,	 in	grateful	 recognition	of	 the	grace	of	 the	divine	
freedom	we	cannot	venture	 the	opposite	 statement	 that	 there	
cannot	and	will	not	be	this	final	opening	up	and	enlargement	of	
the	circle	of	election	and	calling.4	
We	 cannot	 limit	 ‘the	 loving-kindness	 of	 God.’	 In	 either	 extreme	
we	 would	 be	 imposing	 a	 ‘historical	 metaphysic’	 which	 cannot	 be	
legitimately	 done,	 for	 nothing	 can	 impinge	 on	 the	 free	 decision	 of	
God.5	The	two	choices	are	not	primarily	between	‘limited	atonement’	
and	‘universalism’	as	a	pre-determined	arrangement,	rather	 they	are	
between	 the	 two	 coming	 eschatalogical	 results	 which	 are	 possible:	
either	some	will	remain	outside	the	circle	of	salvation	or	all	will	be	
included	in	it.	These	two	possible	results	do	not	have	to	be	linked	to	
old	doctrines	of	limited	atonement	or	universalism.
This	passage	shows	that	Barth’s	theology	of	election	is	open-ended.	
Whatever	the	end	will	reveal,	it	will	be	consistent	with	God’s	holiness,	
love	 and	 freedom.	But	 from	our	finite	 vantage	 point,	 it	 remains	 an	
open	question	how	many	will	be	saved.	The	salvation	of	all	humanity	
is	not	ruled	out,	but	neither	is	it	affirmed.	
Other	 portions	 of	 Barth’s	Church Dogmatics,	 however,	 prompt	
Greggs	 to	 say	 ‘the	 tenor	 of	 Barth’s	 soteriology	 clearly	 points	 in	
a	 universalist	 direction’.6	 Greggs	 lists	 aphorisms	 that	 point	 in	 the	
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direction	of	universal	salvation	to	support	his	claim.	These	are	part	of	
the	record,	but	they	are	usually	inconclusive.	Often	the	full	review	of	
his	remarks	show	that	Barth	never	lost	the	balance	between	the	two	
eschatological	possibilities.	
For	example,	‘The	dogma	is	that	Hell	exists,	not	that	people	are	
in	 it’.7	 This	 cannot	 stand	 alone,	 because	 Barth	 refused	 to	 declare	
whether	hell	is	empty	or	occupied.	He	affirmed	the	victory	of	Christ	
over	hell,	which	gives	Christ	the	authority	to	make	that	determination.	
However,	Barth	did	not	teach	it	was	impossible	for	an	individual	to	be	
eternally	lost.	He	held	that	terrifying	prospect	together	with	the	belief	
that	Christ	has	the	freedom	to	set	prisoners	free	from	hell,	yet	without	
presumption	about	the	final	outcome.8
T.	 F.	 Torrance	 said	 a	 universalist	 argument	 may	 ‘point	 to	 the	
possibility	that	all	might	be	saved	in	as	much	as	God	loves	all	to	the	
utmost,	but	it	does	not	and	cannot	carry	as	a	corollary	the	impossibility	
of	being	eternally	lost.	The	fallacy	of	every	universalist	argument	lies	
not	in	proving	the	love	of	God	to	be	universal	and	omnipotent	but	in	
laying	down	the	impossibility	of	ultimate	damnation.’9	Judged	by	this	
standard,	Barth	avoided	the	‘universalist	fallacy’:	he	did	not	teach	it	
is	impossible	for	a	human	to	be	damned.	Here	is	a	significant	wedge	
between	Barth	and	prominent	varieties	of	universalism.
Greggs	is	correct	in	saying	that	‘Barth’s	rejection	of	universalism	
or	apokatastasis does	not	involve	a	limitation	of	God’s	ultimate	salvific	
work’.10	The	above	passage	on	election	from	Church Dogmatics	II.2	
indicates	 just	 this	 point.	 No	 limitation	 may	 be	 placed	 on	 God,	 no	
‘historical	metaphysic’	that	requires	anything	of	God	is	permissible.	
Thus	Greggs	is	right	to	say	that	in	Barth’s	thought	God	is	free	to	save	
everyone,	but	he	needs	to	add	that	in	Barth’s	thought	God	is	not	bound	
to	do	so.	
Greggs	argues	that	what	Barth	actually	rejected	when	he	rejected	
universalism	 were	 ‘problematic	 elements’	 associated	 with	 it.	 By	
implication,	 these	 elements	 could	 be	 removed	 without	 nullifying	
the	 belief	 that	 all	may	 or	will	 be	 saved	 in	 the	 end.	He	 argues	 that	
‘in	rejecting	universalism,	Barth	 is	not	 rejecting	 the	final	victory	of	
Christ,	 but	 rejecting	 a	 particular	 (and	wrong)	 understanding	 of	 the	
means by	which	this	is	achieved.’	Once	these	negative	elements	are	
removed,	Barth	still	allows	for	the	ultimate	salvation	of	all,	because	
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the	ultimate	‘victory	is	Jesus	Christ’s.’11
Yet	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 know	whether	 these	 are,	 in	 fact,	 equivalent	
concepts.	 Different	 scenarios	 arise	 which	 could	 accommodate	 or	
describe	 the	ultimate	victory:	 (1)	 some	 remain	under	 judgment	 and	
recognize	 the	 lordship	 of	 Christ	 without	 loving	 it;	 (2)	 some	 are	
graciously	 allowed	 to	 go	 into	 an	 eternal	 sleep	 and	 are	 annihilated,	
with	nothing	rebellious	remaining,	or	(3)	through	the	aeons	the	Holy	
Spirit	works	healing	grace	into	all	hearts	and	minds,	wooing	until	the	
last	reticent	rebel	comes	home.	Each	of	these	has	been	proposed,	not	
necessarily	by	Barth,	but	by	theologians	committed	to	meshing	their	
theologies	with	the	witness	of	the	biblical	canon.	Without	favouring	
one	 over	 the	 other,	 it	 seems	 fair	 to	 ask	 whether	 we	 have	 a	 clear	
understanding	of	what	is	meant	by	the	vital	referent	‘victory	of	Jesus	
Christ’?	Without	greater	clarity	about	the	content	of	this	phrase,	it	is	
impossible	 to	 judge	the	suitability	of	 identifying	universal	salvation	
with	it.
We	cannot	say	in	advance	exactly	what	the	full	revelation	of	the	
victory	of	Christ	will	entail,	any	more	than	we	can	visually	imagine	
the	new	heavens	and	new	earth.	Therefore	there	is	no	basis	on	which	
we	can	claim	to	know	that	all	who	reject	the	love	of	God	in	time	will	
come	to	welcome	that	same	love	in	eternity.
Finally,	we	concede	too	much	if	we	allow	Greggs	 to	say	that	 in	
‘rejecting	 universalism	 or	 apokatastasis’	 Barth	 is	 only	 rejecting	 a	
faulty	method	of	reasoning.	This	 is	 tantamount	 to	saying	that	Barth	
rejects	the	argument	for	the	conclusion,	but	not	the	conclusion	itself.	
But	this	is	clearly	at	issue	and	may	be	a	case	of	Greggs	begging	the	
question.	How	does	he	know	Barth	 is	 not	 rejecting	 the	universalist	
conclusion?	 Greggs	 says	 that	 when	 Barth	 spoke	 of	 rejecting	
universalism	he	really	meant	only	to	reject	a	faulty	chain	of	reasoning	
called	apokatastasis.	 But	 the	 reverse	may	more	 likely	 be	 the	 case:	
when	Barth	spoke	of	rejecting	apokatastasis	he	meant	he	was	rejecting	
universalism.	As	we	will	see	below,	Barth	spoke	of	apokatastasis as	
a	way	 of	 emphasizing	 that	 he	 did	 not	 affirm	or	 teach	 that	 ‘all	will	
be	 saved’,	 thus	he	 (consciously)	used	 the	words	 ‘universalism’	 and	
‘apokatastasis’	interchangeably.	He	did	not	speak	negatively	of	only	
one	form	of	universalism	or	one	argument	for	it,	but	rather	he	spoke	
negatively	of	any	conclusion	declaring	‘all	will	be	saved’.
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Reclaiming	 and	 incorporating	 an	 important	 reminder	 from	
Thomas	F.	Torrance
Barth’s	position	on	the	impropriety	of	imposing	any	necessity	on	God	
was	both	consistent	with	and	reflective	of	an	underlying	presupposition	
to	which	 he	was	 thoroughly	 committed.	T.	 F.	Torrance	 pointed	 out	
that	 Barth	 refused	 to	 operate	with	 logico-causal	 connections	 in	 his	
thinking	about	God	and	humanity	and	God	and	the	created	universe.	
It	 is	unfortunate	 that	Torrance’s	 insight	 is	one	 to	which	 insufficient	
attention	has	been	paid.
Torrance	faulted	the	Latin	tradition	for	introducing	logico-causal,	
or	logically	necessary	relations,	between	God	and	humanity	into	our	
understanding	of	election,	a	problem	which	does	not	trouble	the	Greek	
tradition.12	In	other	theological	contexts	this	error	always,	in	his	view,	
led	to	disastrous	distortions	that	ought	to	have	been	avoided.	Torrance	
argued	that	both	‘universalism’	and	‘limited	atonement’	are	actually	
twin	 heresies	 because	 they	 both	 stem	 from	 the	 same	 underlying	
problem:	the	error	of	operating	with	logico-causal	connections	in	our	
thinking	about	God’s	interaction	with	humanity.	He	illustrated	this	as	
follows:	
If	you	think	with	logical-causal	connections	then	if	Christ	died	
for	 all	men	all	men	have	 to	be	 saved.	And	 if	you	 say	Stalin	
and	Hitler	went	to	hell,	then	you	say	He	didn’t	die	for	all	men	
[…].	 But	 both	 those	mistakes,	 the	 limited	 atonement	 or	 the	
universalism,	have	a	fundamental	problem	behind	them:	they	
substitute	for	the	Holy	Ghost	logical-causal	connections.	That	
is	the	real	error.13
Torrance	 argued	 that	 Barth	 refused	 to	 operate	 with	 logico-causal	
connections	 in	 all	 his	 theological	 thinking.	 Thus	 we	 should	 be	
cautious	about	calling	Barth	a	universalist	because	of	his	affirmation	
that	 Christ	 was	 elected	 to	 redeem	 all	 humanity,	 and	 therefore	 all	
humans	find	their	election	in	Christ.	Election	is	not	deterministic	in	
Barth’s	theology.	The	relation	of	the	world	to	God	rests	on	‘the	free	
contingent	activity’	of	God’s	grace,	and	is	not	logically	necessary.	The	
nature	 of	 the	 relation	of	God	 to	 humanity	 and	 creation	 is	 always	 a	
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relation	of	grace	and	freedom	on	God’s	part,	and	our	contingency	and	
dependence	must	be	acknowledged.	No	effort	to	build	a	logical	bridge	
to	God	in	our	theologizing	is	acceptable.14
Torrance	thought	 the	charge	of	universalism	made	against	Barth	
generally	 happened	 because	 of	 the	 tendency	 ‘of	 construing	 the	
efficacy	of	the	atonement	in	terms	of	a	logico-causal	relation	between	
the	death	of	Christ	and	the	forgiveness	of	our	sins.	Here	these	critics	
appear	 to	 substitute	 an	 operation	 of	 causal	 grace	 in	 the	 cross	 in	
place	of	the	ineffable	activity	of	God	the	Holy	Spirit	so	wonderfully	
revealed	in	Jesus’	birth	of	the	Virgin	Mary	and	his	bodily	resurrection	
from	 the	 dead.’	When	we	 substitute	 the	 unique	 activity	 of	God	 for	
‘activity	of	another	kind	which	we	can	construe,	in	terms	of	necessary	
relations’	we	 come	 ‘rather	 near	 to	 sinning	 against	 the	Holy	 Spirit.’	
Thus	he	warns	against	the	rationalistic	ways	of	constructing	the	saving	
life	and	acts	of	Jesus	Christ	as	are	found	in	‘the	twin	errors	of	limited	
atonement	and	universalism.’15
Torrance	 emphasized	 that	 Barth	 did	 not	 operate	 with	 this	 kind	
of	error.	Thus,	in	addition	to	Barth’s	doctrine	of	election,	we	cannot	
understand	 the	 heart	 of	 Barth’s	 thinking	 about	 redemption	 and	 the	
‘victory	of	Jesus’	unless	we	keep	 this	 truth	 in	mind.	Because	Barth	
affirms	Christ	is	the	Reconciler	does	not	mean,	in	a	deterministic	sense,	
that	 in	 his	 thought	 every	 individual	must be	 reconciled	 in	 the	 end.	
Whether	reading	in	Church Dogmatics	volumes	II	or	IV,	we	cannot	
legitimately	 introduce	 determinism	where	Barth	 never	welcomed	 it	
and	where,	as	an	element	in	his	understanding,	it	did	not	exist.	
Examining	Barth’s	statements	in	his	later	years
On	 various	 occasions	 Karl	 Barth	 made	 responses	 to	 questions	
concerning	 universalism.	 Eberhard	 Busch,	 for	 example,	 reports	
Barth’s	 1959	 statement	 about	 an	 earlier	 disagreement	with	Richard	
Imberg,	 pietist	 and	 universalist.	Barth	 said,	 ‘I	 once	 said	 to	 him:	 “I	
don’t	 believe	 in	 universalism,	 but	 I	 do	 believe	 in	 Jesus	Christ,	 the	
reconciler	of	all.”’16	In	this	short	sentence	the	clear	emphasis	is	on	the	
reconciling	work	of	Christ,	coupled	with	a	rejection	of	universalism.	
Yet	without	seeing	the	transcript	or	hearing	the	full	recording	to	which	
Busch	 had	 access,	we	may	wonder	whether	Barth	 added	 clarifying	
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remarks.	It	is	difficult	to	build	too	much	on	this	short	comment.	Does	
Barth	hope	that	Christ	will	reconcile	all	or	expect	Christ	will	reconcile	
all?	
At	a	convention	in	Strasbourg	in	1961,	Barth	gave	this	answer	to	a	
question	about	apokatastasis:	
It	is	the	theory	that	finally	and	ultimately	all	men,	and	possibly	
the	devil	too,	will	be	saved,	whether	they	wish	it	or	not.	[...]	It	
is	a	very	agreeable	theory	–	it	is	very	pleasant	to	imagine	that	
everything	turns	out	right	in	the	end.	I	have	never	upheld	this	
theory,	and	never	shall.	On	the	other	hand	I	should	certainly	
not	uphold	the	converse:	I	should	not	say	that	the	end	will	be	
as	we	see	it	portrayed	in	the	early	paintings	–	some	people	in	
heaven	and	the	rest	in	hell.17	
Barth’s	 rejection	 of	 ‘all	 will	 be	 saved’	 does	 not	 move	 him	 into	
accepting	that	many	or	most	will	be	damned.	Here	Barth	juxtaposes	a	
position	he	rejects	with	its	extreme	opposite,	also	a	position	he	rejects,	
in	order	to	present	an	alternative.
He	continued,	
But	what	we	can	do	is	realize	that	complete	reconciliation	and	
salvation	are	prepared	for	all	men	in	Jesus	Christ,	that	all	men	
will	one	day	have	to	appear	before	Jesus	Christ	as	their	judge,	
and	 the	 judge	will	 be	 free	 to	 pass	 judgment.	We	 should	 not	
presuppose	that	the	judge	will	put	these	people	–	these	awful	
people	–	on	one	side,	and	on	the	other	the	good	who	will	then	
march	white-clad	into	heaven,	while	the	yawning	mouth	of	hell	
swallows	up	the	others.	We	cannot	say	that	because	we	know	
that	he	has	overcome	hell,	but	he	has	the	liberty	to	decide	to	
whom	he	will	give	the	benefit	of	this	victory	over	hell.	Neither	
can	we	say,	according	to	the	apokatastasis	theory,	that	all	will	
be	saved.	We	shouldn’t	try	to	solve	this	problem	of	the	future	
automatically.18
This	 illustrates	Barth’s	 refusal	 to	 proclaim	 the	 future	 decision	God	
will	 make.	 It	 also	 illustrates	 that	 Barth	 used	 apokatastasis	 as	 a	
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label	 for	 ‘universalism,’	 as	 something	 that	 represents	 any	 doctrinal	
position	 that	 declares	 ‘all	 will	 be	 saved.’	 To	 say	 that	 when	 Barth	
rejects	apokatastasis he	is	only	rejecting	a	faulty	form	of	universalism	
appears	dubious.	Barth	rejected	affirming	the	conclusion	that	all	will	
be	saved.
In	May	1962	Karl	Barth	met	with	students	at	Princeton	Theological	
Seminary,	where	he	answered	a	variety	of	questions,	 including	one	
about	universalism	and	the	extent	of	salvation:19
Student:	 Dr.	 Barth,	 I	 wonder	 if	 you	 can	 tell	 us	 what	 your	
thoughts	are	on	universal	salvation?	Who	or	what	is	included	
in	salvation?
Barth:	If	you	have	read	something	of	my	books	you	will	have	
found	out	 that	 I	have	never	 teached	universal	salvation.	And	
that	cannot	be	done.	Under	“universal	salvation”	I	understand	
what	Origen	has	 told	people:	 in	 the	end	all	will	be	good,	all	
will	be	saved,	even	the	devil	is	coming	home	and	so	on.	That’s	
too	easy.	And	we	are	not	allowed	to	say	such	a	thing	because	
salvation	is	an	act	and	a	decision	of	God’s	free	grace.
And	if	we	proclaim,	‘Well,	we	are	all	saved,	we	all	will	end	
in	a	blessed	way’	then	we	take	away	God’s	freedom	to	do	it.	
We	can	only	believe,	we	can	only	hope,	we	can	only	pray	for:	
that	not	only	we,	but	also	others,	may	be	saved,	you	see,	and	all	
others.	And	now	I	should	say	it	is	necessary	that	you	think	so.	
We	cannot	avoid,	if	we	understand	Jesus	Christ	and	his	work,	
then	to	look	for	–	yes	to	look	for	universal	salvation	–	not	to	
proclaim	it,	but	to	look	for	[it],	and	to	deal	with	every	man	in	
the	light	of	the	fact	that	Christ	has	died	also	for	him.
If	I	believe	that	I	myself	have	a	saviour	in	him,	then	I	cannot	
avoid	to	think	on	other	people	as	if	they	had	no	saviour.	In	so	
far,	 I	 look	 upon	 the	 salvation	 of	 all	without	 proclaiming	 all	
shall	and	will	be	saved,	because	it’s	always God’s	free	grace,	
and	for	all	others. It	is	God’s	grace	when	I	will	be	saved,	not	to	
speak	of	the	whole	humanity.	Do	you	understand?20
Given	the	timing	(1962)	and	the	clear	intent	of	the	question,	it	is	not	
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a	 strained	 interpretation	 to	 say	 that	 the	 question	 comprehends	 and	
encompasses	 the	 entire	 corpus	 of	 Barth’s	 work.	 In	 fact,	 for	 all	 its	
shortness	and	simplicity,	the	question	was	so	comprehensive	in	scope	
that	it	went	beyond	an	interpretation	of	Barth’s	publications	to	explore	
his	most	current	opinion	or	conclusion,	whether	expressed	previously	
in	writing	or	not.	Nothing	limits	the	range	of	discussion	merely	to	a	
form	of	the	doctrine	of	apokatastasis,	nor	are	his	conclusions	restricted	
to	 his	 reasoning	 about	 universalism	 as	 opposed,	 say,	 to	 Christ’s	
reconciling	work	or	the	extent	of	Christ’s	victory.	The	question	jumps	
beyond	the	method	or	processes	of	Barth’s	reasoning	to	address	his	
conclusions	about	the	eschatological	end.	It	can	easily	apply	to	both/
and:	to	the	question	of	whether	universalism	is	valid,	as	well	as	the	
range	and	extent	of	Christ’s	victory	over	all	opposition.	Given	Barth’s	
lifelong	contemplation	of	interrelated	doctrinal	questions	and	the	full	
range	of	possible	ramifications,	the	answer	was	as	comprehensive	as	
the	question	was	in	intent:	‘Who	or	what	will	be	saved?’	
Firstly,	 in	 his	 answer	 Barth	 rejects	 universalism.	 There	 is	 no	
escaping	the	clarion	statement,	‘I	have	never	taught	it.’	We	can	look	
at	 all	 the	 theological	 nuances	 and	 ramifications	 that	 come	 to	mind	
in	Barth’s	massive	 corpus,	 and	yet,	 in	 all	 fairness,	we	have	 to	deal	
with	 Barth’s	 answer,	 stated	 clearly	 and	 publicly	 as	 he	 gave	 it	 at	
Princeton.	Barth	did	not	think	that	anything	he	had	written	introduced	
universalism	 under	 any	 guise,	 neither	 as	 something	 inherent	 in	 or	
as	a	 logical	consequence	of	his	 theological	 ideas.	If	 this	analysis	of	
his	 statement	 is	 correct,	we	can	go	on	 to	question	whether	he	used	
the	phrase	 ‘Jesus	 is	 victor’	 elsewhere	 as	 a	 coded	way	 to	 affirm	 the	
ultimate	salvation	of	all	humanity.	
There	 was	 a	 boundary	 condition	 which	 he	 could	 not	 remove,	
no	 matter	 how	 strong	 his	 desire	 for	 universal	 salvation,	 no	 matter	
how	great	his	hope	for	it,	so	that	in	the	end	he	could	not	teach	it	as	
a	 sure	 thing.	He	would	 not	 encroach	 upon	God’s	 ultimate	 freedom	
in	 judgment	 and	 grace.	And	 for	 that	 same	 reason	 he	 could	 not	 say	
universalism	was	impossible.	He	could	only	say	he	didn’t	know.	But	
to	hope	or	say	universalism	is	possible	is	not	the	same	as	teaching	it	
as	certainty	or	dogma.
When	questions	on	Barth’s	meaning	 in	any	part	of	his	magnum	
opus	 cannot	 easily	 be	 resolved	 in	 our	 interpretative	 attempts,	 we	
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cannot	 legitimately	 eliminate	 from	 consideration	 Barth’s	 clearly-
stated	self-interpretation	of	his	own	theology.	His	answer	at	Princeton	
harmonizes	with	the	other	statements	we	have	quoted,	so	it	does	not	
stand	alone.	By	his	own	admission	Barth	was	not	a	universalist.	He	
neither	 proclaimed	 it	 nor	 defended	 it	 as	 an	 acceptable	 theological	
position.	Above	all,	God’s	freedom	must	be	maintained	and	honoured	
in	this	area	of	speculative	theologizing.
What	 about	 Barth’s	 desire	 for	 universal	 salvation?	 Is	 this	 a	
ground	for	fault-finding?
Some	may	attempt	to	make	the	case	that	Barth	was	an	unconscious	
universalist,	 which	would	 shift	 the	 discussion	 in	 another	 direction.	
Perhaps	other	philosophers	and	theologians	can	make	their	own	case	
for	universalism.	Such	efforts	are,	however,	outside	our	discussion.21
Barth	 may	 actually	 have	 desired	 the	 salvation	 of	 every	 human	
being.	Yet	desire	for	the	salvation	of	all	humans	does	not	discredit	him	
or	provide	grounds	for	disavowal.	The	desire	to	see	God’s	forgiveness	
include	 all	 people	 is	 never	 forbidden	 in	 the	 biblical	 canon.	 In	 fact,	
our	desire	for	the	salvation	of	our	neighbour	may	be	harmonized	with	
God’s	desire	for	the	salvation	of	all.22	Christians	may	hope	that	God’s	
‘mercy	triumphs	over	judgment.’23	The	affirmation	of	the	goodness	of	
such	hope	has	been	echoed	by	other	theologians,	including	Hans	Urs	
von	Balthasar24	and	Richard	John	Neuhaus.	As	Neuhaus	points	out	in	
his	discussion	of	the	Lord’s	Prayer,	forgiving	others	their	trespasses	is	
consistent	with	the	desire	that	all	be	forgiven.25
Charles	 Moule	 explored	 the	 message	 of	 hope	 in	 the	 New	
Testament.	He	held	in	tension	human	freedom	to	reject	God	and	God’s	
infinitely	patient	love,	without	eliminating	either	factor.	God’s	claim	
on	our	allegiance	is	stringent:	‘The	more	loving	Love	is	seen	to	be,	
the	deeper	is	the	horror	of	rejecting	it,	even	for	an	instant.’	Yet	Moule	
also	 affirms	 the	 tenacity	 of	God’s	 love	 as	 portrayed	 in	 the	 book	of	
Hosea:	‘The	prophet	finds	he	cannot	give	up	his	wicked	wife,	try	as	
he	will.	Can	we	believe	the	love	of	God	in	Jesus	to	be	less	tenacious?	
I	cannot	believe	that	such	love	does	not	pursue	us	even	in	hell.	If	we	
cannot	rest	without	knowing	that	our	loved	ones	are	right	with	God,	is	
it	conceivable	that	God	can	be	content	to	let	them	go?’
T
page 43
But	Moule	adds,	‘if	you	agree	in	this,	it	does	not	in	the	slightest	
degree	 reduce	 the	 claims	of	God’s	 love	 and	 the	 intense	urgency	of	
a	 decision	 [...]	 “If	 we	 decide	 for	 universalism,”	 wrote	 Dr.	 John	
Baillie,	“it	must	be	for	a	form	of	 it	which	does	nothing	to	decrease	
the	urgency	of	immediate	repentance	and	which	makes	no	promise	to	
the	procrastinating	sinner.”’26	The	stern	biblical	warnings	of	judgment	
cannot	be	neglected.
Torrance	 concurs.	 He	 stood	 with	 Barth	 in	 affirming	 that	 in	 the	
death	of	Jesus	Christ	‘God	has	enacted	a	justification	of	the	ungodly.’	
Yet	he	also	spoke	of	the	appalling	possibility	of	choosing	to	contradict	
God,	a	possibility	which	is	allowed	by	God	and	is	an	unfathomable	
mystery.	Do	not	the	New	Testament	writers	speak	of	a	judgment	that	
would	separate	the	children	of	light	from	the	children	of	darkness?	Is	
this	not	to	be	feared?	Torrance	argued	that	modern	preaching	is	weak	
because	it	lacks	the	eschatalogical	urgency	of	the	New	Testament:	‘It	
is	the	infinite	urgency	of	the	situation	that	life	and	death	hang	in	the	
balances	 and	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 choose	 death	 as	well	 as	 life.	No	
doctrine	 that	 cuts	 the	nerve	of	 that	 urgency	 in	 the	Gospel	 can	be	 a	
doctrine	 of	 love,	 but	 only	 an	 abiding	menace	 to	 the	Gospel	 and	 to	
mankind.’27
Conclusion
Across	 the	 years	 there	 was	 movement	 in	 Barth’s	 thought	 and	 he	
candidly	 acknowledged	 areas	where	 he	 had	 changed	 his	mind,	 but	
on	this	controversial	point	he	does	not	indicate	there	was	any	change.	
Near	the	end	of	his	life,	with	a	vast	amount	of	his	theology	published,	
he	 stated	 that	 he	was	 not	 a	 universalist	 and	 never	 had	 been.	 In	 his	
theological	 output	 we	 may	 certainly	 find	 evidence	 of	 a	 tendency	
towards	 universalism,	 or	 a	 desire	 to	 affirm	hope	 for	 the	 restoration	
of	 all	 things,	 but	 such	 a	 tendency	was	 always	moderated	 and	 held	
in	check	by	his	ultimate	reverence	for	God.	Barth	neither	wanted	to	
presume	on	God’s	grace	nor	compromise	God’s	freedom.	He	hoped	
for	universal	salvation,	but	refused	to	declare	it.
T
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